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This paper deals with the actors and the changing power relations involved in global financial regulation. 
It explores the private sector’s influence on Basel III regulatory reforms, which were formulated by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision as a response to the global financial crisis following the US 
subprime mortgage crisis in 2007-2008. Scholars argue that the dynamic between market actors and regu-
lators of international finance has experienced a shift in power during the last couple of decades. Banks 
and other financial institutions have become more influential at the expense of states and regulatory insti-
tutions. This essay argues that private actors are important to ensure legitimacy and efficiency of regula-
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1. Introduction 
This essay studies the impact of private actors’ preferences on Basel III – a set of global capital 
and liquidity requirements formulated by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). 
The intention is to contribute toward greater insights into the role and influence of private actors 
within global financial regulation. I use a qualitative method analyzing press releases and official 
statements from the bank lobby and the BCBS, as well as opinion articles from reporters, com-
mentators, experts and scholars.  
The research question is inspired by Copelovitch’s (2010) call for more research on the private-
public dynamic in international financial regulation. Scholars argue that the private sector is be-
coming increasingly influential in international financial regulation, and that power is moving 
from states to private institutions (Cohen 2008; Mosley 2005; Copelovitch 2010; Underhill and 
Zhang 2008). It’s important to pay closer attention to this process in order to know who actually 
makes the decisions, who benefits and whose preferences are compromised. I attempt to use the 
case of Basel III to study this shift in power within international financial regulation. 
The essay is structured as follows. First, the main aspects and intentions of Basel III are pre-
sented. Second, I briefly outline the agents within global financial regulation and explain how 
power has shifted between the actors during the last couple of decades. Third, I identify and pre-
sent the actors of interest in this analysis: the BCBS and the Institute for International Finance 
(IIF). Fourth, the method of analysis and sources of data are presented. Fifth, I discuss the re-
spective preferences of regulators and the private sector in terms of financial regulation. Sixth, 
the channels of influence available to the IIF are discussed. The analysis consists of two parts. 
First, I look at the communication between the IIF and the BCBS chronologically in the process 
toward the final formulation of Basel III. The second part is an evaluation of expert opinions on 
how the bank lobby has influenced Basel III. Finally, I sum up the most important findings and 
point to further research.  
2. Basel III 
The following paragraphs lay out the most important elements of Basel III, and explain the inten-
tion of the regulatory reform. The Basel III accord is a set of capital and liquidity requirements, 
which was initiated in 2009 as a response to the global financial crisis that started with the US 
subprime mortgage crisis. The intention behind Basel III is to improve global financial stability 
and reduce the risk of future crises (BCBS 2011). To achieve these goals, Basel III capital and 
liquidity standards require raising the level and quality of capital in the banking system, increasing 
liquidity buffers and reducing unstable funding structures (BCBS 2010a). Basel III is the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision’s (BCBS) second revision to Basel I, which came into being 
in 1988. Basel III is consistent with the overall framework of Basel II, but the mechanisms of the 
requirements are improved (Elliott 2010). Basel II had left loopholes allowing banks to take risks 
that were not covered by capital and to securitize debt to cover up its size (Morrison 2012). The 
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Basel III reform is both micro- and macro-prudential, targeting the resilience of individual banks 
and institutions, as well as system wide risks (BCBS 2012c).  
Basel III is complex and detailed, however, the presentation below provides a general explanation 
of the categories, with extra attention paid to the elements of dispute between the bank lobby 
and the BCBS. The requirements of Basel III concern capital, liquidity and systematically impor-
tant financial institutions (SIFIs). 
2.1 Capital requirements 
The capital requirements of Basel III are organized into three pillars. Pillar one includes require-
ments regarding quality and level of capital, a capital conservation buffer of 7%, and a counter-
cyclical buffer of 0-2,5% of common equity in situations where credit growth is resulting in unac-
ceptable systematic risk. In addition pillar one includes diverse requirements for risk coverage, 
and a leverage ratio. The non-risk-based leverage ratio includes off-balance sheet exposures and is 
supposed to serve as a backstop to risk-based capital requirements. The second pillar concerns 
risk management and supervision and the third pillar deals with market discipline and securitiza-
tion (BCBS 2012b). 
2.2 Liquidity requirements 
The liquidity standards of Basel III contain four elements: 1) liquidity coverage ratio; 2) net stable 
funding ratio; 3) sound liquidity risk management and supervision; and 4) supervisory monitor-
ing. The liquidity coverage ratio requires banks to have enough liquid assets to survive a 30-day 
stressed funding scenario. The net stable funding ratio is a long-term ratio, which encourages 
banks to use stable sources of funding. It is designed to uncover liquidity mismatches. Sound 
liquidity risk management and supervision principles are based on the lessons learned from the 
crisis and have been fundamentally reviewed since the original principles from 2008. The last 
element, supervisory monitoring, is a set of metrics to assist supervisors in identifying and analyz-
ing liquidity risks, at both micro- and macro-level (BCBS 2012b). 
2.3 Systemically important financial institutions 
In addition to the requirements outlined above, Basel III prescribes stricter measures to globally 
systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs).The SIFIs pose a greater threat to global fi-
nancial system, and must therefore have a higher loss absorbency capacity. The loss absorbency 
requirement depends on the individual systemic banks importance. BCBS has developed a meth-
odology to identify the SIFIs, which includes both quantitative indicators and qualitative elements 
(BCBS 2012b). 
3. Governance of global finance  
To evaluate the impact of the private sector on regulation, it’s essential to have some understand-
ing of the mechanisms of global financial government, the actors involved and the changing role 
of the private sector.  
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Governance of global finance is exercised by a range of agents: governments, “clubs” of powerful 
states (G7, G20), public-private initiatives, international organizations and by private financial 
institutions themselves (Mosley 2005). The most important international regulatory institutions in 
the governance of global finance today are the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS), 
the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Joint Forum 
and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). These institutions in-
volve the private sector on a consultative basis, or invite the industry to formal participation 
(Mosley 2005). The private sector is an important source for information and effective imple-
mentation of regulatory reforms. Compliance and effectiveness of regulatory reforms are likely to 
increase when the industry has had a say in the formulation of requirements. This is because pri-
vate sector participation increases legitimacy and reputation of regulatory institutions (Broome 
2008). However, when private actors are engaged in regulation, the outcome may be compro-
mised in favor of the industry, and to the disadvantage of the public good (Mosley 2005). The 
intention behind regulation is to promote financial stability, prevent global crises and to limit the 
immense social costs they incur. Both regulators and the industry agree on the importance of 
regulation, but when private actors become too influential, regulation is watered down and may 
lose effects (Mosley 2005).  
Nevertheless, private actors have become increasingly influential in global finance regulation, 
although they have no formal say or vote at the table of regulators. Cohen (2008) suggests that 
the power relation in international monetary affairs are becoming more diffuse and ambiguous. 
Most importantly, power is moving from states to private actors (Underhill and Zhang 2008). 
Cohen (2008) mentions three major developments, which account for this shift in power rela-
tions: 1) creation of the euro, 2) increased global payment imbalances and, 3) globalization of 
financial markets. The third factor is crucial to understanding the increased power of private ac-
tors. “By promoting capital mobility, financial globalization enhances the authority of market 
agents at the expense of sovereign governments” (Cohen 2008:463). Financial globalization has 
given market agents a wider range of options and greater freedom to maneuver. This in turn 
means less freedom for states, which are forced into the trade-off between currency stability and 
monetary policy autonomy.  
Now, one can ask why states are willing to cede power to private actors. Underhill and Zhang 
(2008) suggest two explanations: 1) finance is technical, common people have no understanding 
of and thus no interest in having their say; 2) when states disagree on regulation, private actors 
can enter and exercise their influence in the vacuum (Underhill and Zhang 2008).  
Whether the increased power of the private sector is favorable, is a question of a different paper 
all together. The important thing is that due to globalization and the complex interdependence of 
markets, private actors have become increasingly important to world politics – in financial regula-
tion, as well as in other areas (Mosley 2005). For the sake of democracy, the compromised 
autonomy of states through vague and diffuse mechanisms deserves greater focus in research. It 
is important to know who makes the decisions, to uncover whether the public good is being 
compromised to the advantage of capitalists.  
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 This essay looks at the concrete case of Basel III and evaluates how and to what extent the pri-
vate sector has influenced the final regulatory outcome. I have chosen to let the IIF represent the 
private sector. It is easier manageable to evaluate influence on policy outcome, when one institu-
tion is taken to represent the interest of a whole sector. Of course, this is a simplification of real-
ity, but I believe it is fair to assume that the IIF represents roughly the average interests of the 
private financial institutions. IIF is the only global association of private financial institutions, its 
members include all types of institutions from insurance companies to rating agencies, and it is 
considering to speak the voice of global banking (Westlake 2010).  
The following paragraphs provide a brief presentation of the actors of interest in this paper; the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the Institute for International Finance 
(IIF). 
4. Actors of interest 
4.1 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
The BCBS is a regulatory body consisting of banking supervisory representatives from a number 
of industrialized countries. The core members are from the traditional banking powers in 
Europe, USA and Japan. The BCBS is situated in the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) in 
Basel, but is only loosely affiliated with it. The Committee has no supranational authority, but 
serves as an advisory body to governments. It is best known for its international standards on 
capital adequacy: the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision and the Concordat on 
cross-border banking supervision. Countries are expected to implement the codes and standards 
formulated by the BCBS, but in practice implementation is often only partially conducted and 
with delay. In addition to regulating the BCBS provides a forum for cooperation and common 
understanding of banking supervisory matters, including the circulation of research to its mem-
bers (Elliott 2010; BCBS 2012a).  
4.2 Institute for International Finance  
The IIF is the biggest and most important actor of the international financial industry. The IIF is 
the only global association of financial institutions representing over 450 leading institutions 
worldwide (IIF 2012a). It is viewed as “the global voice of international banking” (Westlake 
2010). Its members include the most important financial institutions worldwide ranging from 
commercial and investment banks, sovereign wealth funds, asset managers, hedge funds, insur-
ance companies, multinational corporations, law firms, export credit agencies, multilateral agen-
cies, development banks, to other organizations providing products and services to the financial 
community. The mission of the IIF is to manage risks, develop best practices and advocate regu-
latory, financial and economic policies in the interest of its members (IIF 2012a). In addition to 
providing a forum of cooperation among its members, the IIF is a lobby agent, targeting policy-
makers and regulators and aiming to shape public debate on financial regulation.  
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5. Methods and data 
The method applied is a qualitative analysis of press releases, official statements and letters issued 
by the IIF and the BCBS. In addition, I use opinion articles from reporters, commentators, ex-
perts and scholars. Statements by the bank lobby itself are not an ideal source for understanding 
its power and influence, as pointed out by Salmon (2010): “The problem is that all this noise 
coming from the IIF comes with zero credibility, because it’s the IIF’s job to say these things, 
whether or not they’re true”. Therefore, op-eds and evaluative articles contribute toward a more 
balanced understanding of the negotiating process toward Basel III.  
The main challenge in the analysis is the measurement of influence. According to Cohen 
(2008:456) influence is defined as the ability to shape events and outcomes, which in practice 
means to have the capacity to control the behavior of others (Cohen 2008). It is impossible to 
measure influence on a scale, therefore I will first look at how the IIF has attempted to exercise 
its influence. Then, as far as possible, I will look at how the BCBS made amendments to Basel III 
in response to the bank lobby. Third, by summarizing opinions of experts, I hope to paint a 
rough picture of the impact of the bank lobby on Basel III.  
6. Preferences  
When evaluating actors’ impact on policy outcome, one cannot avoid discussing preferences and 
interests. As expressed by Kapstein (2006:4): “Clearly, it is impossible to speak meaningfully of 
financial agreements like the Basel capital adequacy accords, and associated demands by banks 
and other institutions for a “level playing field,” without making reference to private sector prefe-
rences and interests“. In this section I outline the general preferences and intentions of the BCBS 
in formulating Basel III, and the interests at stake for the industry.  
Historically, the reason for regulating financial markets was the desire to avoid systemic instabil-
ity, and the “…contagious spread of losses across financial institutions that threatens to harm the 
real economy” (Kapstein 2006:2). Kapstein (2006) argues that the globalization of financial mar-
kets has led to interdependencies, which generate tougher competition among financial agents 
and increased risks for international spillovers of domestic crises. Thus, stricter and more com-
plex regulations are essential to protect the system from shocks. The BCBS explicitly states that 
the aim of Basel III is to 1) improve the banking sector's ability to absorb shocks arising from 
financial and economic stress, whatever the source; 2) improve risk management and governance; 
and 3) strengthen banks' transparency and disclosures (BCBS 2012c).   
Just like regulators, private actors seek stability in the financial system because financial crises 
bear significant economic and political costs. Financial institutions have called out to regulators 
to ensure a more level and stable playing field for international finance (Kapstein 2006). Stability 
is the common objective, which make regulators and private actors capable of working together. 
There is broad consensus between the IIF and the BCBS about the need for higher capital buff-
ers and stricter regulations (Elliott 2010; IIF 2012b). Even before the BCBS announced to review 
Basel II, the IIF published a report in response to the ongoing global financial turmoil emphasiz-
ing the need for stricter regulation of various areas within global finance (IIF 2008). The IIF have 
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been consistently supportive of regulatory reforms, which aim at strengthening the resilience of 
the system. “The IIF's Board of Directors, […] welcomes the progress being made in formulating 
a package of core regulatory reform proposals”, were the words of former IIF board member Dr. 
Josef Ackermann in response to the early drafts of Basel III (IIF 2010c). However, the bank 
lobby stresses the importance of adequately targeted reforms, and that the impact of regulation 
on the different financial sectors is well understood (IIF 2012b). “[…] it will be important to 
consider carefully the content, the timing and the calibration of the reforms in order to achieve 
the right balance between stability and growth”, continued Dr. Ackermann (IIF 2010c). Hence, 
the IIF were positive toward the intention of the reforms, but disagreed on a number of the con-
crete measures proposed to achieve stronger system resilience. The industry argued that the initial 
Basel III proposals would increase cost of lending and other financial services, and thus slow 
down growth unnecessarily.  
Initially, the main elements of Basel III to which the bank lobby disagreed were the following: 1) 
The net stable funding ratio; 2) higher capital ratio; 3) use of a leverage ratio; 4) elimination of 
softer forms of capital; and 5) the exclusion of some balance sheet items from capital (Elliott 
2010).  
The industry pushed hard against the net stable funding ratio, even though they did not oppose 
to Basel III covering liquidity. The argument was that safety gains would be minimal, while it 
would incur immense costs for the industry because they would have to change the way they 
fund themselves and the way they invest their assets. Further, the industry argued that the capital 
ratios needed only be raised moderately, because of all the other ways Basel III implied higher 
capital levels (Elliott 2010). The IIF also argued against the leverage ratio, claiming it would run 
the risk of undermining its own objectives. “Any measure to contain leverage should take ac-
count of the differences in business models and funding structures”, the IIF stated (Madigan 
2009). The elimination of softer forms of capital is a threat to banks that rely on cheaper and 
riskier capital. Common stocks are the strongest forms of capital, but also by far the most expen-
sive. The industry therefore lobbied against the elimination of soft capital. Similarly, banks op-
posed the exclusion of some balance sheet items from capital, because banks benefit from some 
of these (Elliott 2010). 
 
7. Channels of influence 
Before analyzing the IIF’s concrete influence on Basel III, I’ll briefly discuss the tools and chan-
nels available to the Institute for advocating its interest toward the BCBS. The IIF does not have 
a seat at the table of regulators in Basel. Therefore the financial industry exercises influence either 
1) through direct lobbying and policy advocacy; or 2) through the power of the market. The sec-
ond, passive type of influence is the dispersed power of the market, also called externalities by the 
economists (Cohen 2008). The focus in this paper is to examine the active influence of the bank 
lobby on Basel III. However, as we will see, the IIF indirectly makes use of market power by 
using threat scenarios as leverage to pressure regulators (Morrison 2012). 
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Active lobbyism is the IIF’s most important mission. Considering its long list of members, the 
IIF occupies a significant position in the global financial system. To communicate the industry’s 
opinion on regulatory affairs, the Institute closely monitors such developments, mobilizes opin-
ions among its members, assesses potential impact of new regulations and maintains a close dia-
logue to public regulators through written communication and face-to-face-discussions (IIF 
2012b). The IIF was invited by the BCBS to informal dialogue on the process toward Basel III 
(IIF 2010c). It also published reports on the consequences of proposed changes to capital and 
liquidity regulation and “[…] commented extensively on all stages of the process” (IIF 2010a). 
The BCBS insisted it was not deaf to the interests of the industry and that the process would be a 
pragmatic one (Bryant and Masters 2010). In addition to the open and official communication 
between the two organizations, there has been a tradition for behind-the-scenes interaction based 
on personal relationships. An example is Peter Cooke, who is the longest serving chairman of the 
BCBS, and also a co-founder of the IIF. Managing director at the IIF, Charles Dallara, is close 
associates with BCBS chairman during the 1990’s, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa (Lall 2010). Ac-
cording to Lall (2010), these relationships have had enormous influence on the work and deci-
sion-making of the BCBS. As shown above, the IIF has numerous opportunities of influence, 
even though the formal vote is lacking.  
 
8. The Basel III process 
In table 1 below I present a rough timeline of the development of Basel III including the actions 
of the BCBS as well as the subsequent official reactions by the IIF. The timeframe of analysis 
ranges from the announcement of enhancement of Basel II in July 2009 to the final document, 
which was endorsed at the G20 summit in Seoul on December 16, 2010. Lobbyism and amend-
ments of details continued beyond this date, but the core requirements were set by the end of 
2010 (KPMG 2010).  
As shown in the table below, the IIF was consulted (April 23, 2009) by the BCBS regarding re-
views of Basel II before the official announcement was made (July 2009). The package presented 
in July 2009 was a strengthening of the Basel II framework, but introduced elements that later 
came to be part of Basel III. The Basel II enhancement emphasized level and quality of capital, as 
well as the introduction of a leverage ratio (BCBS 2009a).  
Just a few days after the BCBS announcement to strengthen capital and liquidity standards, the 
IIF published a report reflecting the views of global financial leaders on the need for stricter fi-
nancial regulation. The industry welcomed the opportunity to build a more efficient and effective 
regulatory system, but stressed that misjudged regulation could have great consequences in terms 
of jobs, investment and growth. Therefore, a coordinated approach to regulation between regula-
tors and the financial sector would be necessary, the IIF argued. Among other things, the report 




Table 1. Timeline of Basel III process and IIF reactions 
Date BCBS action IIF action 
April 23, 2009  Responds to BCBS consultation on en-hancements to Basel II 
July 13, 2009 Official announcement to enhance Basel II  
July 23, 2009  
IIF report: “The financial industry calls 
for action to strengthen the global finan-
cial system and promote stability in 
global financial markets”  
Dec. 17, 2009 Consultative capital and liquidity pro-posals presented  
IIF Briefing Note – Basel II Reform 
Package 
Jan 28, 2009   
IIF Statement of the IIF Board of Direc-
tors on regulatory reform and industry 
practices 
April 16, 2010   IIF response to Basel Committee’s Basel III framework 
May 18, 2010   
IIF press release: “A carefully calibrated 
approach to banking reform is required, 
warns IIF” 
June 10, 2010   
IIF report: “Global financial industry 
leaders support constructive dialogue to 
secure financial sector stability and eco-
nomic growth “ 
July, 2010 Countercyclical capital buffer proposal  
July 26, 2010 
The Group of Governors and Heads of 
Supervision reach broad agreement on 
capital and liquidity reform package 
 
Sept. 10, 2010   Responds to BCBS counter cyclical capi-tal buffer 
Sept. 7, 2010   Letter to the Basel Committee on re-vised capital and liquidity requirements 
Oct. 1, 2010   Responds to Basel Committee proposals on gone concern contingent capital   
Oct. 25, 2010   Comments on US ANPR on removing references to credit ratings in regulations
Dec. 16, 2010 Basel III text endorsement by G20 lead-ers and announcement of QIS results Preliminary analysis of Basel III 
Dec., 2010 
FSB and BCBS on long-term impact of 
capital and liquidity requirements – final 
report 
  
(BCBS 2011; IIF 2012c, 2012d)  
 
The IIF saw this as a counterproductive measure, arguing that systemic risk can emerge from 
complex interaction between institutions, markets or products, and that focusing on a list of insti-
tutions only, would not contribute to the detection of systemic risk. “Artificial restrictions on size 
could produce materially distorting effects and unmanageable risk patterns within the system”, 
argued the IIF (IIF 2009).  
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In December 2009, the BCBS published consultative proposals to strengthen both capital and 
liquidity regulations. The capital requirements presented in July the same year were further 
strengthened paying closer attention to risk management, and minimum liquidity standards were 
introduced. The Committee also announced to review the need for special requirements for sys-
temically important institutions (SIFIs) (BCBS 2009b).  
In response the IIF called for substantial modifications of the proposals, by referring to “the 
tradeoffs between layers of protection and prudent credit provision for economic growth” (IIF 
2010e). The Institute argued that if the reforms were to be implemented as proposed, they would 
create severe economic consequences for the financial industry and for the global economy as a 
whole. The general need for stricter financial regulation was supported, but the Institute set forth 
that: 
Revisions to the proposals, their judicious calibration, consideration of the interdependen-
cies among the proposed measures, full assessment of their cumulative impact and the de-
termination of priorities, and a realistic implementation calendar are all essential before a fi-
nal set of standards is issued for implementation by the global financial industry (IIF 
2010e). 
 
In July 2010, the BCBS proposed a countercyclical capital buffer regime (BCBS 2010b), which 
later came to be part of pillar 1 in the final formulation of Basel III (BCBS 2012b). The intention 
behind this buffer regime as to avoid the build up of systemic risk during periods of excess credit 
growth (BCBS 2010b). The IIF commented on this proposal by embracing the principle of re-
ducing procyclicality, but questioned the macroeconomic methodology of the proposal and 
warned against implementation of  “[…] such an untested mechanism” (IIF 2010f) 
The same month, the Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision1 of the BCBS reached a 
broad agreement on a revised set of capital and liquidity requirements. The agreed upon stan-
dards represented an amended and moderated version of the consultative package proposed in 
December 2009. The BCBS admitted that certain aspect of the proposed requirements could 
potentially have adverse consequences for businesses and for the provision of credit. On capital 
requirements the BCBS made concessions to the common equity component of the Tier 1, the 
treatment of counterparty credit risk and to the definition and transition timing of the leverage 
ratio. The proposals for capital conservation buffer and countercyclical buffer remain unchanged. 
Regarding liquidity, moderations were made concerning the liquidity coverage ratio, including a 
revised definition of qualifying liquid assets. The net stable funding ratio remained, but modifica-
tions of the initial proposal were under consideration (BCBS 2010c).  
In its response the IIF, although recognizing the modifications made to the standards, the Insti-
tute continued to push for “[…] significant revisions to avoid seriously hampering the credit ca-
pacity of the banking sector […] (IIF 2010d). The IIF specifically pointed out deductions of capi-
tal, liquidity ratios, counterparty risk and forward-looking provisioning where further modifica-
tions were needed. A pressing concern for the IIF was also the phase-in schedule of the require-
                                                 
1 The Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision is the governing body of the BCBS. 
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ments. The IIF expressed dissatisfaction about the BCBS ignoring earlier issues of concern raised 
by the IIF (IIF 2010d).   
In December 2010 Basel III was endorsed by G-20 leaders, and the results of the Quantitative 
impact study (QIS) of the BCBS was presented (BCBS 2011). Subsequently the IIF presented 
preliminary analysis of both capital and liquidity requirements (IIF 2012c). Again, a few amend-
ments were made to the standards. In the capital requirements, the requirement to externally 
credit rate guarantors was eliminated, however, the requirement was kept for securitization pur-
poses. Revisions also entailed some concessions to the counterparty risk requirements, although 
the IIF notes that the modifications in this respect only address part of the concerns raised by the 
industry. The capital conservation buffer, the countercyclical buffer and the leverage ratio were 
maintained as proposed (IIF 2010a). 
Regarding liquidity the important modifications concerned a delay in the phase-in of the liquidity 
coverage ratio and the net stable funding ratio, although the ratios remained as strict as earlier 
proposed (IIF 2010b).  
In their preliminary analyses, the IIF points out that a lot of the elements are still under consid-
eration and therefore are lacking in specification and detail. The version of standards presented at 
the G-20 summit in Seoul in December 2010 is the core of Basel III, even though details contin-
ued to be calibrated and refined for months ahead.  
The above chronological run-through of BCBSs work toward Basel III and the IIF reactions 
show that there are strong issues at stake for the bank lobby. They’ve followed the process 
closely, published impact studies and analyses of potential economic consequences, and they have 
clearly expressed their opinions in written letters addressed to the BCBS, or as public statements. 
However, it is impossible to measure the exact influence the bank lobby had on Basel III judging 
from this process. These regulatory requirements are a product of many variables. As pointed out 
by Simon Gleeson, a partner at a law firm: “I think there are some significant concessions her, 
although in many respects they are concessions to common sense, rather than industry lobbying” 
(Reuters 2010). To be able to evaluate the extent of the IIF’s influence I review the opinions of 
financial experts and commentators. 
9. Opinions on bank lobby influence 
There are diverging views among commentators and scholars on the strength of the bank lobby 
with respect to Basel III. However, there seems to be consensus about the fact that the industry 
did have a tangible impact on the end result. Morrison (2012), for example, argues that the bank 
lobby emerged victorious from the battle on Basel III, due to simple tactics: exploitation of the 
changing mood of global finance, and scaremongering. When Basel III was on the table in Basel, 
the financial crisis had turned into an economic crisis, with politicians being more concerned with 
getting the wheels rolling again, rather than regulating finance. This atmosphere was used by the 
IIF to spread threat scenarios of reduced credit provisions, job creation and staggering growth. 
Early 2010, Ranjit Lall, a member of the BCBS, even admitted that the lobby was making head-
way: “While it is clear that some reform will happen, it’s also clear that what’s adopted will be a 
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heavily watered down version of what appears now. It’s inevitable” (Morrison 2012:4). In Morri-
son’s analysis, the fingerprints of the bank lobby are visible in three key areas of Basel III: level of 
capital requirements, loopholes and leverage ratio. The capital requirements fall short of securing 
a stable banking system, argues Morrison (2012). The BCBS however, claim that the require-
ments are still rigorous enough to ensure long-term stability in the system (Reuters 2010). The 
second influence of the bank lobby is the maintenance of loopholes from Basel II. If banks can 
still creatively get around capital requirements they are of no worth, and according to Morrison 
(2012), they still can. The toning down of the leverage ratio is also credited the bank lobby. In 
Morrison’s (2012:7) opinion the leverage ratio in the final version is “[…] of little or no signifi-
cance – if not outright a waste of paper.” His assessment of the bank lobby is that they are able 
to dominate the regulatory debate and that the time to rein in markets effectively will not arrive.  
Several financial commentators shared this view of a strong and influential bank lobby. In June 
2010, Jenkins and Masters (2010) reported that Basel III were to be thinned down due to the 
intense lobbying by the industry. Murphy and Jenkins (2010) reported that “[…] regulators ap-
pear to have responded to politicians and banks, who argued that excessive tightening of the 
rules could constrain growth and lending amid a still-fragile economic recovery […]”. An edito-
rial from The Financial Regulation Forum claimed that the Basel III requirements had been 
amended in response to the pressure put on the BCBS by the IIF. The requirements changed in 
three respects: 1) they are now less aggressive in the redefinition of capital and the timing of that 
redefinition; 2) they are less aggressive in the introduction of global liquidity proposals; and 3) 
they are less aggressive in the timing, but not the levels of key capital ratios (The Financial 
Regulation Forum 2010). Ross (2011) goes as far as to say that “Banks win, we lose. Banks do in 
fact rule the world”. His statement rests on the assumption that the Basel III requirements ended 
up being dangerously low, and not sufficient to prevent another credit-crunch. 
However, not everyone seems as convinced as the above. Salmon (2010), although acknowledg-
ing that the IIF is pushing as hard as it gets, claims that the “the Basel technocrats, happily, seem 
unconvinced, although they have gone so far as to commission an official macroeconomic impact 
assessment to help counter the spin coming from the bank-lobby types at the Institute of Inter-
national Finance”. Elliott (2010) referred to his own discussion with regulators when claiming 
that the key decision-makers heavily discounted the industry’s own analyses, and instead relied on 
the BCBS’ own view that the benefits of greater systemic safety offset the relatively small costs to 
the economy. Even though concessions were made to Basel III due to inevitable lobbying, one 
cannot deny that the BCBS stuck to a set of requirements that are substantially stricter than Basel 




This essay aimed to shed light on the influence of private actors on Basel III. The analysis shows 
that the IIF exercised significant influence on BCBS and contributed to concessions in several 
areas of the Basel III. The private sector possesses significant powers beyond its consultative role 
with respect to regulation. This paper is an attempt to contribute to the body of literature explor-
ing the power relations and interactions between governments, international organizations and 
private actors within global financial regulation. However, the results are specific to the case of 
Basel III and do not necessarily apply to other situations of cooperation within financial regula-
tion. Further research is needed to reach conclusions on general terms. The analysis relies heavily 
on actions and statements made by the IIF, which was taken to represent the entire private finan-
cial industry. This is a major simplification, and studies using data from a wider set of private 
actors will most probably be able to generate more robust results. The ideal research design 
would also aim at pinpointing exactly where the BCBS made concessions because of, and only 
because of, the bank lobby. Due to my limited understanding of technical finance and the limited 
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